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That Old Due Process Magic: Growth Control and the Federal 
Constitution 
Recent years have seen the proliferation of municipal laws limiting 
the number of houses which can be built in a municipality. 1 The pro-
ponents of these laws praise them for giving communities time to de-
velop comprehensive growth plans, for relieving pollution and smog, 
and for helping to preserve the "quality of life."2 Opponents, on the 
other hand, paint them as a self-interested, elitist effort to increase 
property values and fence out newcomers. 3 These growth control or-
dinances (GCOs) usually operate by setting a yearly· cap on the 
number of residential building permits that can be issued. 4 They have 
been passed in cities from Maine to California. 5 In California, more 
than 200 GCOs have been on city ballots since 1981. Seventy percent 
of the ordinances proposed in the past two and a half years have been 
approved.6 
The ordinances are usually enacted when people who are upset 
with traffic congestion, concomitant smog, and related problems tum 
to their local political apparatus for help. It is the wise local politician 
who heeds this call: stubbornly pro-growth politicians seem to have a 
1. THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMN. ON HOUSING, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMN. 
ON HOUSING (1982); Katz & Rosen, The Interjurisdictional Effects of Growth Control on Housing 
Prices, 30 J.L. & EcoN. 149 (1987); Boyarsky, Both Sides in Growth Issue Refining Their Cam-
paigns, L.A. Times, Aug. 2, 1988, § 1, at 15, col. 3 (third part in a four-part series) [hereinafter 
L.A. Times, part III]; Peterson, Land-Use Decisions Via the Ballot Box, N.Y. Times, May 22, 
1988, § 10, at 20, col. 2. · 
2. Katz & Rosen, supra note 1, at 149; Murphy, Old Process a New Weapon in Slow-Growth 
Arsenal, L.A. Times, Aug. 1, 1988, § 1, at 3, col. 1 [hereinafter L.A. Times, part II]; see also Lee 
v. City of Monterey Park, 173 cal. App. 798, 809 ("It is the intent of the People of the City of 
Monterey Park to establish control over the quality ... of growth [in] the City ... [and] 
preserv[e] the character of the community."). 
3. Delogu, The Misuse of Land Use Control Powers Must End: Suggestions for Legislative 
and Judicial Responses, 32 MAINE L. REv. 29 (1980); see also Associated Home Builders v. City 
of Livermore, 18 cat. 3d 582, 616, 557 P.2d 473, 493, 135 cal. Rptr. 41, 61 (1976) (Mosk, J., 
dissenting); Trombley, Slow-Growth Sentiment Builds Fast, L.A. Times, July 31, 1988, § l, at 1, 
col. 1 [hereinafter L.A. Times, part I]. 
4. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Assn. v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976) (upholding a GCO allowing construction of 500 units per year); 
L.A. Times, part III, supra note l, at 30, col. 2; see also Livermore, 18 cal. 3d at 588, 557 P .2d at 
493, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 41 (upholding a GCO which completely halted issue of residential building 
permits); L.A. Times, part II, supra note 2, at 3, col. 1. For a discussion of the variety of tech-
niques which can be employed, see Delogu, supra note 3, at 33-52. For a discussion openly 
advocating exclusionary tactics and evaluating a municipality's probability of success with vari-
ous techniques, see Comment, Speak out Against the Madness: A Laok at How to Control Growth 
in California, 15 W. ST. U. L. REv. 335 (1987). 
5. See, e.g., Livermore, 18 cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 cal. Rptr. 41; Petaluma, 522 F.2d 
897; Begin v. Town of Sabattus, 409 A.2d 1269 (Me. 1979); Delogu, supra note 3, at 44 n.42 
(discussing Maine Planned Growth Ordinance, § 2.1-2). 
6. L.A. Times, part I, supra note 3, at 3, col. 1. 
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limited future.7 Wise politicians and local residents get together, and 
by means of initiative or legislation, enact a GCO. Once a GCO is 
enacted, several things happen. One of the first results is that property 
values increase. When demand for housing in a growing community is 
high and supply is curtailed, prices will rise. In GCO communities, 
this is exactly what occurs.8 This is not, however, an unqualified bo-
nanza for property owners. Higher property values mean higher prop-
erty taxes. The traffic congestion is not likely to improve. The people 
who would have moved there and paid local taxes now simply drive 
through.9 
Another result of GCOs is that local renters will see their rents 
increase.10 Local developers are also affected. Land acquired for de-
velopment ties up capital. As more and more communities pass 
GCOs, there is less work for the carpenters, plumbers, bricklayers, 
and other tradespeople who build the homes. The businesses supply-
ing the construction industry will be affected when construction de-
clines.11 Local commerce will be affected. There will be fewer new 
clients for local retail and service businesses, and fewer retail and ser-
vice businesses will open. 12 
GCOs will also affect people who do not already live in the com-
munity, but who would like to move there. Indeed, keeping new peo-
ple out is precisely what the ordinances are meant to accomplish. t3 
The higher prices and lower supply of homes in the area will make it 
more difficult, more expensive, and less possible for new residents to 
move there. The people GCOs exclude are nonmunicipal federal citi-
zens, and they have an interest in being able to migrate anywhere that 
the winds of national economic fortune might take them. Despite this 
effect on their interests, these extra-municipal citizens seldom chal-
7. Id.; San Diego's News & Views, July 13, 1989, at 6, col. 1, statement of Peter Navarro, 
organizer of PLAN (Prevent Los Angelization Now): "Our major target in the upcoming race is 
to dump [councilperson] Ed Struiksma in the Fifth District. We believe Mr. Struiksma is the 
most dangerous pro-development force on the council." 
8. Katz & Rosen, supra note l, at 159; Schwartz, Hansen & Green, The Effect of Growth 
Control on the Production of Moderate-Priced Housing, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT: KEEPING 
ON TARGET? 15 (D. Porter ed. 1986) [hereinafter Effect of Growth Control]; THE PRESIDENT'S 
COMMN. ON HOUSING, supra note 1, at 204; Trombley, Slow-Growth Initiatives Ignore the Larger 
Problem, L.A. Times, Aug. 3, 1988, § I, at 3, col. 2. 
9. Cf., L.A. Times I, supra note 3, at 30, col. 1 ("[S]uburban 'office' parks have placed an 
additional burden on already strained highways"). 
10. Effect of Growth Control, supra note 8, at 19. Note that since they are predominantly 
dependent on the rental market, the region's poor are especially affected. Problems with home-
lessness will be aggravated if those only marginally able to afford housing are priced out of the 
market. 
11. Rubinfeld, Suburban Employment and Zoning: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 18 J. 
REGIONAL SCI. 33, 40 (1978). 
12. Id. 
13. See Construction Indus. Assn. v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 575-76 (N.D. Cal. 
1974), revd., 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976) ("FINDINGS OF 
FACT •.. , [11hey set about quite openly to curb the population growth in their city."). 
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lenge the ordinances. Rather, it is the local builders and developers 
who take the municipalities to court. When they do, success is rare. 
The ordinances are usually reviewed under the due process clause. 
In part, due process review is a result of the pecuniary nature of the 
developers' interest - GCOs look very much like the government tak-
ing that is typical of due process review. It may also be to some extent 
an accident of historical circumstance. When the mold was set for 
review of land use regulation, when Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 14 
and Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 15 were decided, due process 
was a more attractive vehicle for prospective litigants. At the time, ·so-
called "substantive" due process was a serious and frequently applied 
limit on the government's police power.16 The heyday of substantive 
due process, the New Deal, and the Court's retreat in the face of.the 
court packing plan are the stuff of which legends and constitutional 
law books are made. Although the judiciary's fascination with due 
process has waned, 17 the gaze of land use regulation review has re-
mained fixed on the due process clause. . 
This Note argues that the interests of nonmunicipal federal citizens 
in being able freely to migrate about the nation are not adequately 
accounted for in a due process analysis which sanctions regulations 
with any, even a debatable, relation to the public welfare. 18 
More adaptable and appropriate are the constitutional safeguards 
designed to protect the interests of no~municipal federal citizens: the 
privileges and immunities clause, the right of interstate ~ravel, 19 and 
the commerce clause. This Note concludes that GCOs should be mea-
sured against these safeguards and not the standards of the due pro-
cess clause. When so reviewed, GCOs are found wanting. Indeed, 
this Note argues that the problem with GCOs is not simply that they 
offend a collection of constitutional protections, but that they offend 
14. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (statute forbidding mining so as to cause subsidence of private resi-
dences, even when that mining is done pursuant to stipulation in the property's conveyance, is an 
unconstitutional taking of private property). 
15. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See infra section I.A for a discussion of Euclid. 
16. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 11.3 (3d ed. 1986); L. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 572-81 (2d ed. 1988). 
17. On the other hand, the clause's substantive impact has apparently reemerged in privacy 
cases like Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
18. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text for a more elaborate description of the 
standard. See also 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 3D § 3.20 (1986): 
19. Suggesting that GCOs be reviewed by the standards of the right to interstate travel is not 
an idea original to this Note. See generally Comment, The Right to Travel: Another Constitu-
tional Standard for Local Land Use Regulations?, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 612 (1972) [hereinafter 
Comment, Another Constitutional Standard]; Comment, The Right to Travel and Its Application 
to Restrictive Housing Laws, 66 Nw. U. L. REv. 635 (1971). The proposition has also been 
advanced in at least two cases, Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 
447 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1976), and Construction Indus. Assn. v. City of Petaluma, 522 
F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). See infra note 58 for a discussion of 
Livermore's treatment of the issue. 
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the idea that underlies those constitutional protections. That underly-
ing idea is national unity -. the idea that the nation is and must be a 
cohesive, harmonious unit, that the states must sink or swim together, 
that the health of the national union cannot be taxed by myopic and 
self-interested local regulation. 
Part I first examines the traditional due process standard under 
which GCOs are now reviewed. It next examines the ways in which 
the public welfare component of that standard becomes distorted 
when trying to account for the interests of not only municipal, but also 
nonmunicipal, citizens. That examination begins with a discussion of 
GCO cases in which the standard has become distorted, and concludes 
with an analysis of the problems posed by that distortion. 
As Part I concludes that due process review is inappropriate for 
GCOs, Part II examines the larger federal interests which cause the 
distortion of that standard. GCOs are at their core a particular mu-
nicipality's codification of its dislike for its national neighbors. It is 
that animosity which is at odds with the concept of national unity. If 
the nation is to survive and prosper, harmony must prevail between its 
constituent entities. This concept was not overlooked by the Framers 
when the Constitution was written and ratified. Neither is it a concept 
foreign to the jilrisprudence of the Supreme Court. Part II examines 
these sources as authority for the proposition that fundamental struc-
tural concerns of federalism are implicated and off ended by GCOs. 
Part III examines GCOs under the constitutional standards that 
embody the structural concerns discussed in Part II. The privileges 
and immunities clause,20 the commerce clause,21 and the right of inter-
state travel22 all work to ensure both the equality of treatment of citi-
zens within and among states, and the interstate harmony and 
cooperation which must prevail if the nation is to succeed. Part III 
applies each of these protections to GCOs and in each case finds that 
the only permissible GCOs are those that address problems susceptible 
of no alternative solution. 
I. CURRENT GCO REVIEW 
An understanding of why due process is the wrong standard for 
GCO review begins with an understanding of the standard and how it 
works in GCO cases. Section A of this Part analyzes the development 
of the standard and section B looks at how the standard operates in 
GCO cases, with an emphasis on the distortion of the "public welfare" 
component of that standard by GCO issues. Since that distortion is 
central to due process shortcomings in GCO analysis, section C exam-
20. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 2. 
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,.cl. 3. 
22. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618 (1969). 
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ines more closely how that distortion occurs and the problems it can 
cause. 
A. Traditional Deference to Local Land Use Regulation 
The standards for GCO review find their origin in the U.S. 
Supreme Court's decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 23 
Until Euclid, it was an open question whether any sort of zoning regu-
lation by local communities was constitutionally permissible.24 · State 
courts oflast resort were divided on the issue25 and not until the years 
following Euclid did zoning become commonplace. 26 
The village of Euclid was adjacent to the city of Cleveland. The 
Ambler Realty company owned sixty-eight acres of land in the village. 
The land was bounded by a railroad and a major street and was "in 
the path of progressive industrial development."27 Ambler Realty's 
intention had. been to sell the land for industrial use. In 1922 the vil-
lage adopted a detailed zoning ordinance, establishing six land-use 
classifications and districts. The ordinance prohibited industrial use 
on most of Ambler's land. As a result, the land lost seventy-five per-
cent of its value.28 Ambler Realty contended that the ordinance had 
deprived them of property without due process of law.29 
In examining the law, the Court recognized the "modem" origin 
of zoning laws as a response .to increasea urbanization and more effi-
cient transportation. If the laws were to be upheld, the Court felt that 
they "must find their justification in some aspect of the police power, 
asserted for the public welfare."30 Explaining the standard by which 
that determination would be made, the Court stated that "before the 
23. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
24. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 18, § 3.01, at 83 ("[In] 1926 ..• the Supreme Court of the 
United States disposed of the fundamental question whether this kind of land use restriction is 
offensive to the Constitution of the United States."); 1 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZoNING & 
PLANNING, § 1.01, 1-09 to 1-10 (4th ed. 1975). 
25. 272 U.S. at 390-91. 
26. D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING & LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 71 (1971) 
("After Euclid, so-called Euclidian zoning swept the country."); see also 1 R ANDERSON, supra 
note 18, § 3.10, at 104. 
27. 272 U.S. at 384. 
28. 272 U.S. at 384. 
29. 272 U.S. at 384. They also alleged that the ordinance denied them equal protection of 
the laws and violated art. I,§§ I & 19 of the Ohio Constitution. Section 1 of the Ohio Constitu-
tion bestowed upon "[a]ll men ..• [the] inalienable right [] ... of ... acquiring, possessing and 
protecting property." Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 310 (N.D. Ohio 1924), 
revd. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Section 19 included the guarantee that "[p]rivate property shall ever 
be held inviolate," along with a takings clause. 297 F. at 310. The lower court found that the 
zoning law violated all three provisions as well as the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution. 297 F. at 310. The U.S. Supreme Court considered only the 
federal due process clause issue. In the view of Justice Sutherland, the multiple challenges boiled 
down to a single question: whether the ordinance exceeded the reach of the police power. 272 
U.S. at 386. · 
30. 272 U.S. at 387. 
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ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, [it must be said] that such 
provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substan-
tial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."31 
The zoning regulations were arguably related to the public welfare be-
cause reports showing "every evidence of painstaking consideration" 
concluded that ordinances of the sort would decrease traffic, accidents, 
noise, and would facilitate fire protection. 32 The painstaking report 
was enough to establish the relation to public welfare, because "[if] the 
validity of the legislative classification ... [is] fairly debatable, the 
legislative judgment must be allowed to control. "33 
This formulation has come to characterize the review of local land 
use regulation. Virtually any possible relationship to the "public 
health, safety, morals or general welfare" will make the relation of 
such a regulation to public welfare "fairly debatable" and enable it to 
withstand constitutional challenge. The presumption of constitution-
ality accorded to any legislative act has become virtually insurmounta-
ble in the case of local land use regulation. 34 In 1954 that presumption 
was described by the Court as "well nigh conclusive. " 35 As land use 
regulation has come to include GCOs, so too has the Euclid deference. 
It is worth noting that the opinion itself does not necessarily sup-
port the deference Euclid has come to represent. The opinion is per-
haps explained by that Court's wish to enable communities to respond 
to the historical forces around them. The police power would not be 
arrested by the changing times because "while the meaning of the con-
stitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must 
expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions."36 That 
constitutional guarantees must yield to the demands of a changing so-
ciety could also be construed to mean that since GCOs pose a threat to 
national unity not contemplated by the architects of Euclid, due pro-
cess standards should contract and review of local land use law should 
be invigorated. Any deference suggested by Euclid should perhaps be 
tempered by its recognition that there could be cases "where the gen-
eral public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the munici-
31. 272 U.S. at 395. 
32. 272 U.S. at 394. 
33. 272 U.S. at 388. 
34. The Euclid Court cited a case invoking the presumption for a New York statute prohibit-
ing women from working the night shift in large city restaurants as authority for its "fairly 
debatable" language. 272 U.S. at 388, citing Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924). On that 
presumption, see also 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 18, § 3.14, at 119-21; A. RATHKOPF, supra 
note 24, at § 5.02[1] and cases cited at note 2 therein; D. HAGMAN supra note 26, at 71-72; 
Comment, State and Federal Housing Policy vs. Local Land Use Regulation: The New Conflict 
Between State and Municipal Powers in California, 15 U.S.F. L. REV. 509, 524-25 (1980-81). 
35. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (upholding the taking of private land to be 
turned over to a different private party as part of an urban renewal project, even where it was 
unclear that the land taken was in fact blighted). 
36. 272 U.S. at 387. 
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pality that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the 
way."37 
History casts even more doubt on the proposition that Euclid was 
intended to mandate deference. First, such an approach would have 
been a counterpoint to the heyday of substantive due process then tak-
ing place.38 Second, only two years after Euclid, the Court decided 
Nectow v. City of Cambridge. 39 Nectow was also a zoning case where, 
like Euclid, land being held for industrial use was zoned residential. 
In Nectow, the Court invalidated the ordinance, observing that' "gov-
ernmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the general 
rights of the land owner ... is not unlimited [and where the police 
power justification] is wanting, the action of the zoning authorities ... 
cannot be sustained."40 Where a "painstaking report" was sufficient 
to establish the relation to the public welfare in Euclid, a master's re-
port finding no relation was sufficient to overcome the presumption in 
Nectow. It appears that the Court did not intend Euclid to be a talis-
man of judicial abdication in the face of any land use regulation. 
Moreover, Euclid's observation that the "general public interest" 
could sometimes "outweigh the interest of the municipality"41 fore-
shadows the expanded definition of public welfare in GCO cases. 
B. Public Welfare and GCOs 
The presumption of constitutionality is the yardstick by which an 
ordinance's relation to the public welfare is measured. Traditional due 
process analysis would consider only the possibility that some benefit 
might accrue to the enacting municipality. But the negative extra-mu-
nicipal effects of GCOs coax into the due process standard a variety of 
balancing test. That balancing test comes in through the door marked 
"public welfare." When the definition of public welfare includes only 
the welfare of the municipality, the balance will seldom weigh against 
the enacting community. But where the definition of public welfare 
extends beyond the municipal borders, that balance may tilt the other 
way. For GCOs, a local definition of public welfare will at best lead to 
a tie: higher property values and the planning respite are likely to 
balance against the interests of local renters, developers, and business 
people. With the benefit of Euclid's presumptive deference, the stat-
ute will be upheld. However, if the scope of public welfare includes 
that of the federal citizens who can no longer move to the city, the bad 
37. 272 U.S. at 390. 
38. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 
(1926) (invalidating prohibition on use of substandard filling in bedding materials); see also supra 
note 16. 
39. 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
40. 277 U.S. 183, 188·89. 
41. 272 U.S. at 390. 
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effects of the GCO may outweigh its good effects. The presumption of 
constitutionality should then be vulnerable. Nonetheless, in some 
courts the Euclidian deference will overcome even an expanded defini-
tion of public welfare. Two important GCO cases illustrate this 
pattern. 
1. Where Deference Outweighs Expanded Public Welfare 
The first important case in which an expanded definition of public 
welfare was insufficient to overcome Euclidian deference is Golden v. 
Planning Board of Ramapo. 42 In Ramapo the New York Court of 
Appeals considered an ordinance that limited growth in the village of 
Ramapo by setting a timetable for residential construction. The ordi-
nance delayed development for up'"to 18 years in certain areas."43 It 
operated by awarding approval for subdivision plats according to a 
complicated point system tied to the prior provision of municipal serv-
ices, w~ch the town planned to phase in gradually. Predictably, the 
ordinance was challenged under the fourteenth amendment's due pro-
cess clause. Explaining the standard that would govern its decision, 
the court said that "[w]hat segregates permissible from impermissible 
restrictions, depends in the final analysis upon the purpose of the re-
strictions and their impact in terms of both the community and general 
public interest. "44 The New York court "assume[d] that development 
shall not stop at the community's threshold."45 This formulation sug-
gests that the "public interest" reaches beyond municipal boundaries, 
and the court "only require[s] that communities confront the chal-
lenge of population growth with open doors."46 But the interests of 
those outside the community reflected in an expanded definition of 
public welfare did not overcome the influence of Euclid. The New 
York court repeatedly cites Euclid, even when formulating the re-
gional public interest standard.47 The court cites Euclid for the propo-
sition that "it is the nature of land use and development regulations to 
... impede the forces of natural growth."48 They "assume, therefore, 
that the [ordinance is] the product of foresighted planning calculated 
to promote the welfare of the township."49 The regulation was up-
42. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 
~~ . 
43. 30 N.Y.2d at 380, 285 N.E.2d at 303, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 154. 
44. 30 N.Y.2d at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152 (emphasis added). 
45. 30 N.Y.2d at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152. 
46. 30 N.Y.2d at 379, 285 .N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 153. 
47. The Ramapo court cites Euclid five times: 30 N.Y.2d at 366, 285 N.E.2d at 294, 334 
N.Y.S.2d at 142 (once); 30 N.Y.2d at 371, 285 N.E.2d at 297, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 146 (once); 30 
N.Y.2d at 377, 285 N.E.2d at 301, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 151 (once); and 30 N.Y.2d at 378, 285 
N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152 (twice). 
48. 30 N.Y.2d at 377, 285 N.E.2d at 301, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 151. 
49. 30 N.Y.2d at 380, 285 N.E.2d at 303, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 153. 
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held. The dissent put more emphasis on the regional welfare, and felt 
that the "ordinance ... reflect[s] a parochial stance without regard to 
its impact on the region or the State."so 
The second important GCO case in which expanded public welfare 
failed to overcome Euclidian deference is.Associated Home Builders v. 
· City of Livermore. st Livermore was an important case for several rea-
sons. First, it established the viability in California of initiatives set-
ting caps on the immigration of people into a municipality. The 
viability of GCOs in California makes the case important because Cal-
ifornia is both the most populous states2 and because it has the most 
GCOs. s3 Second, it was a well-written opinion handed down by a 
court to which many sister state courts look for guidance. s4 Third, 
together with Ramapo, it authoritatively established the constitution-
ality of GCOs. Finally, it is important because it explicitly defined the 
public welfare in regional, as opposed to local, terms. 
The case began in 1972 when the city of Livermore approved an 
initiative ordinance halting residential construction. The ordinance 
imposed a moratoriu~ on the issue of residential building permits. 
The drafters of the ordinance had apparently read Euclid or its prog-
eny. ss It declared that "the health, safety and general welfare" of the 
city as reflected in "[e]ducational facilities," "[s]ewage," and "[w]ater 
supply" would be served by allowing "no further residential permits 
... to be issued."S6 Builders and others with interests in continued 
construction secured a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement 
of the ordinance. The city appealed to the California Supreme Court. 
The California Supreme Court first upheld the ordinance against 
municipal enabling clauses7 and vaguenessss challenges. The Builders' 
SO. 30 N.Y.2d at 383, 28S N.E.2d at 30S, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 1S6 (Breitel, J., dissenting). 
St. 18 Cal. 3d S82, SS7 P.2d 473, 13S Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976). 
S2. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1989, at xv. 
S3. L.A. Times, part I, supra note 3, at 3, col. 1. 
S4. Harrison, State Court Activism in Exclusionary-Zoning Cases, in STATE SUPREME 
COURTS: POLICY MAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM SS (M. Porter & G. Tarr eds. 1982); 
Baum & Cannon, State Supreme Courts as Activists: New Doctrines in the Law of Torts, in id. at 
83-84. For a study concluding that the California Supreme Court was at the time a leader in 
judicial activism, sees. FINO, THE ROLE OF STATE SUPREME COURTS IN THE NEW JUDICIAL 
FEDERALISM (1987). 
SS. See L.A. Times I, supra note 3, at 3, col. 1 (discussing a lawyer who writes the ordinances 
for citizens' groups). Compare L.A. Times III, supra note 1, at 3, col. 2 ("It is almost impossible 
to draw a land-use initiative without a lawyer .... "). 
S6. 18 Cal. 3d at S89 n.2, SS7 P.2d at 476 n.2, 13S Cal. Rptr. at 44 n.2. 
S7. 18 Cal. 3d at S96, SS7 P.2d at 481, 13S Cal. Rptr. at 49. In order to do this, it was first 
necessary to overrule a 1929 case, Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 222 P. 308 (1929). 
On enabling acts generally, see 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note·18; § 2.19-29. · 
S8. 18 Cal. 3d at 600, SS7 P.2d at 483, 13S Cal. Rptr. at St. This challenge was the second 
part of a two-pronged police-power attack. The first prong of that attack was the claim that the 
ordinance infringed on the right to interstate travel. 18 Cal. 3d at 600, SS7 P.2d at 483, 13S Cal. 
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Association then advanced the traditional due process challenge, that 
the ordinance was an unconstitutional exercise of the police power. 
The court did not doubt that the "ordinance . . . significantly affects 
nonresidents of the municipality."59 The ordinance, though "superfi-
cially reasonable," might be "unreasonable when viewed from a larger 
perspective."60 Examining the ordinance from this larger perspective, 
the court noted that since "the ordinance may strongly influence the 
supply and distribution of housing for an entire metropolitan region, 
judicial inquiry must consider the welfare of that region. "61 By articu-
lating the public welfare in regional terms, the court broadened the 
scope of the traditional due process standard. The California court 
found support for this broader standard in Euclid, which "recognized 
'the possibility of cases where the general public interest would so far 
outweigh the interest of the municipality that the municipality would 
not be allowed to stand in the way.' "62 But Euclid is better known for 
deference than for balancing. The court noted that "if it is fairly de-
batable that the ordinance is reasonably related to the public welfare, 
the ordinance is constitutional. " 63 This was "the standard of constitu-
tional adjudication . . . set forth in Euclid v. Ambler Co. "64 Cases 
which "declined to accord the traditional deference to legislative judg-
ment" could not "serve as a guide."65 That deference carried with it a 
"presumption of constitutionality" which the Builders' Association 
had failed ·to overcome. 66 The dissent saw the balance as tipping in the 
other direction. Justice Mosk characterized the GCO as a "suburban 
Rptr. at 51. See infra section 111.B. for a discussion of the right of interstate travel. In spite of its 
other merits, this section of the court's opinion relies to some extent on sleight of hand. 
Contrary to its later acknowledgment that "the ordinance may strongly influence the supply 
and distribution of housing" in the region, 18 Cal. 3d at 607, 557 P.2d at 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 
55, the court here claims that the ordinance did "not penalize travel and resettlement," 18 Cal. 
3d at 603, 557 P.2d at 484, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 52; see also supra note 8. Concluding its analysis of 
the right of interstate travel, the court claimed that "[t]he only contrary authority, the decision of 
the federal district court in ... Petaluma .•. has now been reversed by the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit .... 522 F.2d 897, cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934." While it is true that the district 
court's decision was reversed, the California court's language implies that the substantive hold· 
ing, that a GCO violates the fundamental right of interstate travel, was reversed. In fact, the 
Ninth Circuit did not consider the travel issue. It instead determined that the construction associ· 
ation lacked standing to assert a third party's travel rights. Construction Indus. Assn. v. City of 
Petaluma, 522F.2d 897, 905 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). In short, despite 
the California court's adroit linguistics, the only federal court to consider the issue, the district 
court in Petaluma, has decided that GCOs violate the right of interstate travel. 
59. 18 Cal. 3d at 607, 557 P.2d at 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55. 
60. 18 Cal. 3d at 607, 557 P.2d at 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55. 
61. 18 Cal. 3d at 607, 557 P.2d at 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55 (footnote omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
62. 18 Cal. 3d at 607, 557 P.2d at 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56 (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co. 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926)). 
63. 18 Cal. 3d at 606, 557 P.2d at 486, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 54. 
64. 18 Cal. 3d at 606, 557 P.2d at 486, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 54 (citing 272 U.S. 365). 
65. 18 Cal. 3d at 606, 557 P.2d at 486-87, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 54-55. 
66. 18·Cal. 3d at 610, 557 P.2d at 489, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 57. 
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community [that] invokes an elitist concept to construct a mythical 
moat around its perimeter ... to exclude all but its fortunate current 
residents. "67 
2. Where Expanded Public Welfare Overcomes Deference 
Expanded definitions of public welfare will sometimes outweigh 
Euclidian deference. One example of this is the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court's opinion in National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn. 68 In Na-
tional Land, the Pennsylvania city of Easttown was becoming subur-
ban. They passed an ordinance which required a minimum lot size of 
four acres in the township's prime residential land. The value of Na-
tional Land's property dropped seventy-five percent, as had Ambler 
Realty's. They too challenged it under the due process clause. In an 
analysis that initially resembled standard due process review, the court 
observed that the ordinance was related to the public welfare because 
it alleviated sewage and traffic problems and forestalled difficulty in 
providing fire protection. The court stated that the ordinance need 
only "be enacted for the health, safety, morals or general welfare of 
~he community."69 
That general welfare, however, included the surrounding region. 
The zoning power, according to the court, "may not be used as a 
. means to deny the future. . . . It is not difficult to envision the . . . 
chaotic conditions which would result if all the townships in this area 
decided to deny a growing population sites for residential development 
•••• " 70 The court declared the ordinance unconstitutional, closing 
out its opinion with this comment on the public welfare: 
The question posed is whether the township can stand in the way of the 
natural forces which send our growing population into hitherto undevel-
oped areas in search of a comfortable place to live. We have concluded 
not. A zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the en-
trance of newcomers in order to avoid future burdens .... can not be held 
valid .... 
. . . It is clear, however, that the general welfare is not fostered or 
promoted by a zoning ordinance designed to be exclusive and 
exclusionary. 71 
Five years later, in Appeal ofGirsh,72 the Pennsylvania court reiter-
ated its stance. In· Girsh, the Township of Nether Province had re-
67. 18 Cal. 3d at 616, 557 P.2d at 493, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 61 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Cf 
Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 246, 263 A.2d 395, 399 (1970) (A township "cannot be allowed to 
close its doors to others seeking a 'comfortable place to live.'"). See infra notes 72-74 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of Girsh. 
68. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). 
69. 419 Pa. at 522, 215 A.2d at 607. 
70. 419 Pa. at 528, 215 A.2d at 610. 
71. 419 Pa. at 532-33, 215 A.2d at 612. 
72. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). 
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fused to allow apartments within its borders. The court felt the 
township had "made a decision that it is content with things as they 
· are . . . . That decision is unacceptable. "73 The court said that "if 
Nether Province is a logical place for development to take place, it 
should not be heard to say that it will not bear its rightful part of the 
burden."74 
Pennsylvania is not the only court to impose public welfare limits 
on GCOs. In New Hampshire, the state's supreme court considered 
the GCO issue in Beck v. Town of Raymond. 15 The town of Raymond 
enacted an ordinance in 1977 which allowed landowners a maximum 
of four building permits per year. The familiar due process issue was 
"whether the ... ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power."76 
Euclid was cited for the proposition that the "power to restrict and 
regulate population density necessarily implies the authority to . . . 
control population growth."77 While the court had "allowed munici-
palities fairly wide latitude in using their general police power,"78 
there were limits: 
Towns may not refuse to confront the future by building a moat 
around themselves and pulling up the drawbridge. They must develop 
plans to insure that municipal services, which normal growth will re-
quire, will be provided for in an orderly and rational manner. Any limi-
tations on expansion must not unreasonably restrict normal growth. 79 
C. The Problems with an Expanded Definition of Public Welfare 
These examples should illustrate the problems with due process 
review of GCOs .. Whether the substantive outcome is favorable or un-
favorable to GCOs, the procedural outcome is the distortion of the due 
process standard. Due process has three chief concerns, and it is use-
73. 437 Pa. at 244, 263 A.2d at 398. The Pennsylvania court's stance is perhaps influenced 
by their belief that "the right of people to live on land, [is] a very different [question than more 
typical zoning issues]." 437 Pa. at 245, 263 A.2d at 399 (emphasis in original). 
74. 437 Pa. at 245, 263 A.2d at 398-99 (footnote omitted). 
75. 118 N.H. 793, 394 A.2d 847 (1978). 
76. 118 N.H. at 795, 394 A.2d at 849. 
77. 118 N.H. at 796, 394 A.2d at 849. 
78. 118 N.H. at 798, 394 A.2d at 850. 
79. 118 N.H. at 801, 394 A.2d at 852. The court in Raymond was explicit in urging the 
township to come up with a sensible plan to accommodate growth. It decided to allow "the town 
two years at most to develop a master or comprehensive plan" for growth. 118 N.H. at 801, 394 
A.2d at 852. "An ideal solution" to growth problems would be "effective regional or state-wide 
land-use planning." 118 N.H. at 801, 394 A.2d at 852. Though the ordinance was left intact 
during that grace period, the court nonetheless gave developer Beck the requested building per-
mits and cautioned that "[t]his zoning ordinance as a permanent enactment is of doubtful valid-
ity .... Its apparent primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers [and t]his alone is 
not a valid public purpose." 118 N.H. at 801, 394 A.2d at 852 (emphasis in original). The court 
reaffirmed its commitment to regional definitions of public welfare six years later in Stoney-
Brook Dev. Corp. v. Town of Premont, 124 N.H. 583, 474 A.2d 561 (1984). New Hampshire's 
Supreme Court found it "unrealistic" to suggest a three percent growth cap when "the average 
growth in the seven abutting towns is almost double that." 124 N.H. at 589, 474 A.2d at 564. 
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ful to isolate exactly which strand of due process makes GCOs prob-
lematic. Those three concerns are: whether a given procedural forum 
operates fairly with respect to participants; whether a taking of private 
property for public use for which compensation is due has occurred; 
and whether a proposed regulation affecting private property interests 
benefits the public sufficiently to justify that intrusion. 80 
It is the last of these, the "police power" question, that is problem-
atic in the GCO context and which lends itself to expansive formula-
tions. An inquiry into the extent of government power lends itself 
naturally to setting limits on that power. By confining that inquiry, 
the traditionally deferential due process standard permits the govern-
mental actor the freedom necessary to act in the public interest. The 
due process standard traditionally confines that inquiry by asking only 
whether the asserted positive public welfare benefits of the regulation 
actually exist. The distortion in the GCO analysis comes when the 
ordinance's potential negative effects are considered. 
That those negative GCO effects are weighed is understandable. 
GCOs do have potential negative effects, and those effects should be 
considered. Public welfare does seem to be the appropriate analytic 
vehicle. However, there are some problems which arise when this oc-
curs. First, distorting due process standards by including potential 
negative as well as potential positive public welfare effects provides an 
effectively standardless tool for review of every single goveriunent reg-
ulation. This is demonstrated not only by the way the standard was 
handled prior to the court packing crisis, 81 but also by the fact, illus-
trated in section II.B, that an expanded definition of public welfare 
provides no effective barometer of a GCO's constitutionality. Second, 
due process traditionally considers only positive potential public wel-
fare benefits because it, in the usual case, considers the effect of the 
regulation on a particular individual. Adapting it to consider instead 
countervailing collective interests not only distorts the standards and 
makes miscalculation more likely in future individual effect cases, but 
also shortchanges the collective interests being considered. They are 
shortchanged first because the presumptions run against them rather 
than in their favor. The presumption is that the statute is constitu-
tional, a presumption satisfied by a debatable relationship. Second, 
they are shortchanged because the inquiry itself, designed for other 
purposes, will be less able to articulate and recognize those collective 
interests. The voice of national unity and nonmunicipa~ federal citi-
zens' concerns is more readily couched in the language of "privileges 
80. On due process with respect to land use regulation, see D. MANDELKER, LAND USE 
LAW ch. 2 (2d ed. 1988). On due process generally, and the distinction between substantive and 
procedural due process, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 16, at § 10.6. 
81. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
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and immunities" and "interstate relations" than in the language of 
"police power" and "fairly debatable." 
Thus despite its apparent ability to weigh the competing concerns, 
th~ due process clause is the wrong tool for GCO analysis. It is a 
disservice both to the standard and the newly encompassed interests to 
employ due process review. GCOs should instead be examined under 
standards specifically tailored to the implicated collective interests. 
Perhaps the most important of those interests is that of national unity. 
When GCOs say to their national neighbors "keep out," the harmony 
of the union is offended in a way that deserves careful attention. The 
next section explores that topic. 
II. NATIONAL UNITY AND GCOs 
This part is concerned with the effect of GCOs on national unity. 
It begins with a brief examination of how GCOs affect that unity and 
then turns to an analysis of the legal and doctrinal foundations for 
those unity concerns. Section II.A explores the unity concerns ex-
pressed during the framing and ratification of the Constitution. Those 
concerns cast GCOs in a different light: by virtue of their effect on 
national unity, they can no longer be considered simply "local" issues. 
Section II.B examines the ways in which the Constitution itself, both 
textually and structurally, works to ensure national unity. Finally, 
section II.C finds that the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Con-
stitution are also solicitous of national unity concerns. 
As to how GCOs affect national unity, when a city shuts its doors 
to outsiders it does more than lose the benefits of the newcomers' di-
versity. It invites their resentment. It invites both retaliation and em-
ulation. As GCOs proliferate, so does resentment and retaliation. As 
much as their practical effect, the problem with GCOs lies in their 
message. That message, simply put, is: "We don't want you here." If 
there is to be national unity, if the nation is to be a cohesive, successful 
unit, this kind of message cannot go unchecked. It fans the flames of 
factionalism in ways that have been problematic since the Framers' 
time. When they structured the new government, that federal struc-
ture included a strong strand of national unity. Thus national unity is 
a component, of federalism. It is important to examine that compo-
nent here because these federalism concerns inform the privileges and 
immunities clause, right of interstate travel and commerce clause anal-
yses that will be undertaken in Part III. 
. That national unity is a component of federalism may seem an 
unusual claim. Most djscussion of federalism is focused on the alloca-
tion of power between levels of government, and the amount of power 
that resides in the states after creation of the national government. 82 
82. R. BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987); W. BENNEIT, AMERICAN 
THEORIES OF FEDERALISM (1964); C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITU· 
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But there could be no discussion of how that authority was allocated if 
a national union had not been created. Although how much power 
resides in the states is an important issue, the power.vested in the fed-
eral government must, at a minimum, be sufficient to maintain the 
union created. It is no secret that the chief reason for calling the Con-
stitutional Convention was that government under the Articles of 
Confederation was unable to protect the union. 83 The implicit, often 
assumed, consideration in the allocation of power between the national 
and state governments is the ability of the national government to 
maintain the health of the national union. While reasonable people 
might differ over whether that allocation has in certain areas tilted too 
sharply toward the federal government84 or whether that tilt is justi-
fied by historical change, 85 this Part will instead elucidate that often 
overlooked premise. It begins by examining the framing of the Consti-
tution and the Framers' efforts to equip the union with a charter suffi-
cient to protect itself against threats to its unity. 
A. National Unity: Goals and Means at the Time of Framing 
A key concern of the Framers was not simply that economic rela-
tions under the Articles of Confederation were hindered, but that fac-
tion and divisiveness among the member states was leading to discord 
and disunion. James Madison characterized the Confederation as 
"notoriously feeble. "86 He would later write that "most of us carried 
into the Convention a profound impression produced by the exper-
ienced inadequacy of the old Confederation ... as to the necessity of 
binding the States together by a strong Constitution."87 Madison 
hoped that the Constitution would help remedy "the gross and disrep-
utable inequalities which had been prominent in the internal adminis-
TIONAL LAW (1969); FEDERALISM: INFINITE VARIETY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (V. Earle 
ed. 1968); D. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM (1987); C. FRIEDRICH, TRENDS OF FEDERAL-
ISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1968); R. LEACH, AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1970); R. POUND, 
FEDERALISM AS A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS (1942). All cites are passim. 
83. Broyles, Federalism and Political Life, in SAVING THE REVOLUTION: THE FEDERALIST 
PAPERS AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 71-72 (C. Kesler ed. 1987); D. ELAZAR, supra note 82, 
at 94, 106; M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 44 (1944); R. LEACH, supra 
note 82 at 3-4; Mason, The Constitutional Convention, in THE" CONFEDERATION AND THE CON-
STITUTION 38 (G. Wood ed. 1973); W. MURPHY, THE TRIUMPH OF NATIONALISM 49 (1967); 
W. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 16-18 (1964). See also infra 
notes ,87-108 and accompanying text. 
84. Compare B. MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1964) (advocating a strong 
federal role in the civil rights arena) with DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, THE STATUS OF FEDER-
ALISM IN AMERICA: A REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON FEDERALISM (1986) (advocating 
increased state autonomy). 
85. See Jaffa, The Case for A Stronger National Government, in A NATION OF STATES 106 
(R. Goldwin ed. 1963); R. POUND, supra note 82, at 49. 
86. III THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 135 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1937) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]. 
87. III THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 449 (M. Farrand ed. 
1911) [hereinafter FARRAND] (letter of J. Madison to J.G. Jackson). 
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trations of most of the States."88 It would exert a "restraining 
influence . . . on the aberrations of the States . . . stifl[ing] wishes & 
inclinations which w[oul]d otherwise ripen into overt & pernicious 
acts."89 
When commenting on William Patterson's plan for the union, 
Madison wanted to know if "it [will] prevent trespasses of the States 
on each other?"90 The problem with Patterson's plan was that it left 
the states "as much at liberty as ever to execute their unrighteous 
projects ag[ain]st each other."91 As an example he referred to "Acts 
of Virg[ini]a & Maryland which give a preference to their own citi-
zens. "92 The multiple authority to coin money was leading to "retali-
ating acts ... which threatened danger not to the harmony only, but 
the tranquility of the Union."93 
The concern of the Framers with interstate discord is also reflected 
in the words of Alexander Hamilton. Writing in The Federalist No. 
22, he said: 
The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, con-
trary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in different instances, given 
just cause of umbrage and complaint to others, and it is to be feared that 
examples of this nature, if not restrained by a national control, would be 
multiplied and extended till [sic] they became not less serious sources of 
animosity and discord than injurious impediments to the [commerce] be-
tween the different parts of the Confederacy .... [W]e may reasonably 
expect, from the gradual conflicts of State regulations, that the citizens of 
each would at length come to be considered and treated by the others in 
no better light than that of foreigners and aliens. 94 
At the debate of New York's ratification convention, Hamilton ex-
plained that one weakness of the Confederate Congress was that its 
members had "a strong and uniform attachment to the interests of 
their own state. These interests ... have too often been preferred to 
the welfare of the Union."95 He articulated the same sentiment on 
another occasion: 
[T]he members have but too frequently displayed the character rather of 
partisans of their respective States than of impartial guardians of a com-
mon interest . . . the great interests of the nation have suffered on a 
hundred [occasions] from an undue attention to the local prejudices, in-
terests, and views of the particular States.96 
88. Id. 
89. III FARRAND, supra note 87, at 455. 
90. I FARRAND, supra note 87, at 317. 
91. Id. at 318. 
92. Id. at 317. 
93. Id. at 318. 
94. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 133 (A. Hamilton) (P. Ford ed. 1898). 
95. II ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 266 .. 
96. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 94, No. 46 (J. Madison), at 314. 
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Assemblyperson Iredell noted the same problem in the ratification 
debate in North Carolina. In the process, he provided an apparently 
unwitting display of the discord to which factionalism was leading. 
He was addressing the objection that the Constitution required only 
two-thirds of its members in order to be amended. The Articles re-
quired unanimity, and it was argued that this safeguard was impor-
tant. Iredell countered that allowing a single state to thwart the will of 
the majority was a less appealing alternative. He used the example of 
Rhode Island, which "uniformly opposed every regulation for the ben-
efit and honor of the Union at large."97 He continued that "the happi-
ness of all America ought not to be sacrificed to the caprice and 
obstinacy of so inconsiderable a part."98 
Although the confrontational rather than conciliatory nature of 
these remarks may have been alarming, it was, in the minds of the 
Framers, a likely more serious token of that discord that the state of 
Massachusetts, in contravention of the Articles, was assembling an 
army "without having even deigned to apprise Cong[res]s of Her 
intention."99 
Given the Framers' evident concern with interstate conflict, na-
tional disunion, and local prejudice, it is to be expected that they pro-
posed some solution. Hamilton ironically wondered "shall we then 
form a constitution to cherish and strengthen these prejudices? Shall 
we confirm the distemper, instead of remedying it?"100 The purpose of 
the nation-building enterprise was to remedy that conflict. That rem-
edy was to be a charter designed to reach and cure the causes of 
disharmony. 
Hamilton felt that the advantages to be gained from the constitu-
tion "consist chiefly in the restraints which the preservation of the 
Union will impose on local factions." 101 James Wilson of Philadelphia 
wanted to "fill, as fast as possible; this extensive country, with men 
who shall live happy, free, and secure" and wondered "how is it to be 
accomplished, but by establishing peace and harmony among our-
selves?"102 As the purpose of the Constitution was to ·check faction, so 
the reach of the powers granted by the Constitution had to extend to 
the causes of faction. As Hamilton stated, "[ w ]hatever practices may 
have a tendency to disturb the harmony between the States are proper 
objects of federal superintendence and control."103 On June 13, 1787, 
the convention "[r]esolved that the national Legislature ought to be 
97. IV ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 229. 
98. Id. 
99. I FARRAND, supra note 87, at 316. 
100. II ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 305. 
101. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 94, No. 85 (A. Hamilton), at 582. 
102. II ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 462-63. 
103. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 94, No. 80 (A. Hamilton), at 534. 
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empowered ... to legislate in all cases ... in which the harmony of the 
United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legisla-
tion." 104 Patrick McHenry's understanding of the Constitutional 
Convention was that its purpose had been the ''preservation of the 
union. " 105 
Wilson, explaining the powers of the new government, said: 
Whatever object of government is confined, in its operation and effects, 
within the bounds of a particular state, should be considered as belong-
ing to the government of that state; whatever object of government ex-
tends, in its operation or effects, beyond the bounds of a particular state, 
should be considered as belonging to the government of the United 
States." 106 
This formulation confirms that GCOs are not simply a local issue. 
They are laws whose effects extend beyond the bounds of a particular 
state, that may disturb the harmony between the states. They involve 
the exercise of power by municipal governments in a fashion un-
friendly to the health of the union. The central theme in the formation 
of our federal system is that there be union and that the union be 
empowered to reach "practices [tending] to disturb the harmony'' of 
the union. 107 
The usual federalism argument might urge a deference to GCOs 
out of respect for the sovereign creatures of the states. That matters of 
local interest might occasionally affect interstate relations is just a nec-
essary side effect of the shared power that makes our federal system 
function. There are three problems with this argument. The first is 
that it exaggerates the definition of what is "local." The second is that 
it ignores much of the Constitution's history and that history's con-
cern with national unity. Finally, such an argument is undermined by 
the fact that GCOs involve municipal, rather than state, power. In 
one of the few specific references to municipal, rather than state, 
power, Madison asked "was the precious blood of thousands spilt ... 
not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty and safety, 
but that ... particular municipal establishments[] might enjoy a cer-
tain extent of power?"lOS 
B. Structural Constitutional Aspects of National Unity 
While it is almost redundant to speak about both federalism and 
structure, it is worth briefly examining how successful the Framers 
were in carrying out their intent to create national unity with the Con-
stitution. An examination of the ways in which the Constitution actu-
104. I FARRAND, supra note 87, at 225. 
105. II FARRAND, supra note 87, at 211 (emphasis in original). 
106. II ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 86, at 424. 
107. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 94, No. 80 (A. Hamilton), at 534. 
108. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 94, No. 45 (J. Madison), at 304. 
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ally operates to preserve national unity will further elucidate the status 
of national unity as an aspect of federalism. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the structural scheme which 
ensures national unity is the supremacy clause.109 That clause 
grounds the government in the proposition that the interests of the 
collectivity are supreme. This ensures that factional self-interest must 
give way to considerations of collective welfare. National unity would 
be nearly, if not completely, impossible where there could be no curb 
on factional, self-interested conduct. 
. The federal structure also contributes to national unity py reducing 
the opportunities for interstate friction. The Constitution structures 
relations between citizens and other states, and between states, so as to 
eliminate potential conflicts. Some examples will help illustrate this 
pattern. The privileges and immunities clause reduces. the opportuni-
ties for friction by ensuring even-handed treatment of federal citi-
zens.110 The full faith and credit clause111 and the extradition 
clause112 mandate interstate cooperation on potentially contentious is-
sues. The commerce power is vested solely in Congress, and states are 
forbidden to tax the commerce of other states. 113 Populous states are 
disabled from using congressional majorities to wield the commerce 
power to their benefit both by uniform senate representation and by a 
specific prohibition in section nine of article one.114 · 
Finally, where these efforts fail to eliminate interstate contentious-
ness, the constitutional scheme ameliorates the effect of the dispute. 
Article III provides an independent and disinterested judicial forum. 
Section two of article III emphasizes this function of the federal judici-
ary by exhaustively committing to federal jurisdiction various inter-
state conflicts. Thus the intentions of the Framers largely coincide 
with the resultant federal scheme: national unity is protected by fed-
eral authority to eliminate, reduce, or adjudicate instance$ of interstate 
friction. 
C. National Unity According to the Supreme Court 
The evidence for national unity as a component of federalism does 
not end with the Framers' understanding and execution of the Consti-
tution. What the Framers codified, the courts have been called upon 
time and again to interpret. On the occasions when it has considered 
questions of national unity, the Supreme Court has found itself in 
109. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
110. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
111. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
112. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. 
113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 ("No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Com-
merce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another"). 
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agreement with the Framers about the importance of national unity. 
The commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause are the 
textual foundations of the Constitution's national unity prescrip-
tion.115 The Court's observations on the national unity strand of fed-
eralism are typically found in cases interpreting these clauses. This 
section examines some of these cases and in them finds further support 
for the national unity component of federalism. 
Hicklin v. Orbeck 116 clearly articulates the national unity concerns 
of federalism. Hicklin involved a challenge to the Alaska hire law, 
which granted an unqualified hiring preference to Alaskans in oil-
resource-exploiting employment. In Hicklin, the Court based its hold-
ing on the privileges and immunities clause. Despite the usual practice 
of not reaching an analysis under alternative grounds, 117 a unanimous 
Court nonetheless went on to examine the law in light of several com-
merce clause decisions. It did so because of "the mutually reinforcing 
relationship between the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, 
§ 2, and the Commerce Clause - a relationship that stems from . . . 
their shared vision of federalism." 118 That shared vision was one the 
Court had earlier described as that of harmony between the states, of 
"a single nation - one and the same people."119 
It was a vision of federalism that the Court had discussed at length 
in Austin v. New Hampshire. 120 Austin involved a complicated tax sys-
tem which favored New Hampshire residents. Tax classifications like 
the one at issue in Austin normally benefit from judicial deference. 
But that deference was inappropriate not only where the Court was 
charged with "the protection of individual liberties," but also where 
the regulation intruded upon 
the maintenance of our constitutional federalism. The Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, by making noncitizenship or nonresidence an im-
proper basis for locating a special burden, implicates . . . the structural 
balance essential to the concept of federalism. Since nonresidents are not 
represented in the taxing State's legislative halls, judicial acquiescence in 
taxation schellles that burden them particularly would remit them to 
such redress as they could secure through their own State; but "to pre-
vent [retaliation] was one of the chief ends sought to be accomplished by 
the adoption of the Constitution."121 
115. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text. 
116. 437 U.S. 518 (1978). 
117. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (The "Ashwander Rules") ("The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitu-
tional law in advance of the necessity of deciding itJ "). 
118. 437 U.S. 531-32 (footnote omitted). 
119. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 596, ajfd., 263 U.S. 350 (1923) (commerce 
clause) (natural gas producing state may not require preference for its consumers). 
120. 420 U.S. 656 (1975). 
121. 420 U.S. at 662 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Travis v. Yale & Towne 
Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 82 (1920)). 
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This formulation points out that one important advantage of the 
national union is that the interests of all its members are considered in 
its forums. State and local process seldom considers the interests of 
outsiders. The outsiders have no say in the local agenda which none-
theless affects them. The inaccessibility of local process to outsiders 
implicates fundamental structural concerns of federalism. Where 
these federalism concerns are implicated, the Court has stated that the 
judiciary should review the legislation with "an appropriately height-
ened ... standard of review."122 In a privileges and immunities clause 
context, that standard disables states from making distinctions which 
"hinder the formation, the purpose, or the development of a single 
Union of those States."123 
That heightened standard of review is reflected in the court's skep-
tical attitude toward the justifications offered for laws which make 
those unity-hindering distinctions. This is illustrated by the Court's 
opinion in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc. 124 Seelig was a commerce 
clause challenge to a New York law setting minimum prices for milk 
imported into New York. This implicated the commerce clause and 
the national unity concerns of federalism by discouraging competition 
in the "economic unit [that] is the Nation."125 It was argued that the 
protection against sister state competition was justified because the 
true goal of the law was the health of New York's residents. By guar-
anteeing dairy farmers' incomes, the state could ensure "a regular and 
adequate supply of pure and wholesome milk."126 But a hard look at 
that reasoning left the Court unpersuaded: 
To give entrance to that excuse would be to invite a speedy end of our 
national solidarity. The Constitution was framed under the dominion of 
a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the 
theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, 
and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not 
division.127 
This vision of federalism can also be found in City of Philadelphia 
v. New Jersey. 128 New Jersey had justified the exclusion of out-of-state 
waste from its landfills on the basis of environmental concerns. The 
Court felt it was unnecessary to examine the justification "because its 
resolution would not be relevant to the constitutional issue to be de-
cided in this case."129 Why New Jersey had done it was not as impor-
tant as what New Jersey had done. "What is crucial is the attempt by 
122. 420 U.S. at 663. 
123. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Ganie Commn., 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978). 
124. 294 U.S. 511 (1935). 
125. H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 537 (1949). 
126. 294 U.S. at 523. 
127. 294 U.S. at 523. 
128. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
129. 437 U.S. at 626. 
1266 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1245 
one State ~o isolate itself from a problem common to many by erecting 
a barrier against the movement of interstate trade."130 Alluding to the 
shared structural concerns of the two clauses, the Court cited both 
privileges and immunities clause and commerce clause cases for the 
proposition that it "ha[s] consistently found parochial legislation of 
this kind to be constitutionally invalid."131 So'it was that New Jersey 
had to take New York's garbage. And in the GCO context, if New 
Jersey must take New'York's garbage, then California must take the 
Midwest's people. When a city shuts its doors to outsiders, it invites 
their resentment. They invite, by their example, emulation and a 
proliferation of places unavailable to the rest of the nation's people 
that could in turn make for a fractured and unhappy nation. No view 
of federalism that would rob the nation of its ability to deal with such 
a threat can be sound. It is certainly not consistent with the Supreme 
Court's view of our Constitution. 
III. GCOs AND SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS 
The view of the Supreme Court informs the GCO issue not only in 
its observations about federalism, but also in its treatment of the con-
stitutional protections that most frequently involve national unity is-
sues. Those protections are the privileges and immunities clause, the 
right of interstate travel, and the commerce clause. The three share a 
common theme: that the United States is not merely a collection of 
trading partners, but a cohesive union of people and states whose ulti-
mate success will depend on their cooperation and their collective ef-
forts. Given the extent to which GCOs implicate national unity 
concerns, it is appropriate that this Note concludes with an examina-
tion of the protections that embody that unity. Such an examination is 
certainly more appropriate to an issue raising those concerns than is 
due process analysis. Although due process is the traditional vehicle 
for GCO analysis, its standards become distorted when trying to deal 
with the broader federal interests implicated by GCOs. This Part out-
lines in separate sections the substantive standards of the protections 
better suited to those interests: the privileges and immunities clause, 
the right of interstate travel, and the commerce clause. GCOs are 
then tested by these standards. The results of all three analyses are 
similar. All three tests ask whether any constitutionally unintrusive 
alternative means are available. Each test also finds that most GCOs 
are constitutionally infirm. 
130. 437 U.S. at 628. 
131. 437 U.S. at 627. The Court's statement was followed by citations to, inter a/ia, Toomer 
v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (privileges and immunities clause) (see infra text accompanying 
notes 140-41 for a discussion of Toomer); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (commerce 
clause) (see infra text accompanying notes 204-06 for a discussion of Edwards); Seelig, 294 U.S. 
511 (1935) (commerce clause). 
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A. The Privileges and Immunities Clause 
This section applies the privileges and immunities clause to GCOs. 
GCOs implicate the privileges and immunities clause by virtue of their 
effect on citizens' ability to migrate and settle in GCO-enacting com-
munities. The key word in the preceding sentence is effect. This sec-
tion first establishes that GCOs that offend the privileges and 
immunities clause not facially, but only in their effect, should nonethe-
less be subject to privileges and immunities clause scrutiny. This sec-
tion then turns to an analysis of the privileges and immunities clause 
standard and its application to GCOs. 
1. Of Privileges, Immunities, and Facial Neutrality 
GCOs are facially neutral in their treatment of nonmunicipal in-
state and nonmunicipal out-of-state citizens. Even municipal citizens 
wishing to relocate in a GCO-enacting community would feel the 
same effects. 132 This Note argues that GCOs are noµetheless subject 
to privileges and immunities clause scrutiny. 
First, to the extent that the facial neutrality argument depends on 
the idea that nonmunicipal in-state residents are similarly disadvan-
taged, that argument has been specifically rejected by the ·Court. 
When considering a municipal hire law in United Building and Con~ 
struction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 133 the Court "con-
clude[ d] that [the] ordinance is not immune from constitutional review 
at the behest of out-of-state residents merely because some in-state res-
idents are similarly disadvantaged."134 
Another reason the privileges and immunities clause should reach 
GCOs comes from the Framers' understanding of the Constitution. 
As discussed supra in section II.A, the Framers believed that they 
were establishing a charter with power sufficient to reach "[w]hatever 
practices may have a tendency to disturb the harmony between the 
states."135 That intent is frustrated when a constitutional provision is 
unable to reach threats to that unity. The Framers' understanding 
would thus be confounded by an argument that concedes the constitu-
tionality of facially neutral legislation. 
Reliance on the language and intent of the privileges and immuni-
ties clause also argues for subjecting facially neutral GCOs to privi-
leges and immunities clause scrutiny. The language of the privileges 
and immunities clause is straightforward. "The Citizens of each State 
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the 
132. Although these effects would be felt to a far lesser degree by municipal residents who 
were property owners and thus had enjoyed a GCO-engendered rise in property values. 
133. 465 U.S. 208 (1984). 
134. 465 U.S. at 217-18. 
135. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 94, No. 80 (A. Hamilton), at 534. 
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several States."136 It does not include only "those Privileges and Im-
munities offended by facially discriminatory enactments." Nor does it 
exclude "those Privileges and Immunities abridged by the effect of 
facially neutral provisions." It says that "all" citizens "shall" be enti-
tled to "all" privileges and immunities.137 The logistics of applying 
the clause to a new area of the law should not result in its being 
rewritten. 
Additionally, the Court has been quite explicit about the import of 
the clause. It has more than once said that "[t]he primary purpose of 
this clause ... was to help fuse into one Nation a collection of in-
dependent, sovereign States."138 Since the clause intends to bind to-
gether t:p.e national union it should invalidate laws that disrupt that 
unity. Their disruptive effect does not depend on whether or not the 
regulation is facially neutral; it depends on the regulation's effect. 
GCOs operate to fence out people, to hinder patterns of national mi-
gration, to disrupt commerce and to give vent to, and to invite recipro-
cal, feelings of distrust and hostility between national neighbors. That 
these effects are not listed on the face of the statute should not shield it 
from the privileges and immunities clause. As one commentator put 
it, "discrimination does not wear its badge on its sleeve."139 
In adqition, when conducting the privileges and immunities clause 
inquiry, the Court often examines the effect of the challenged regula-
tions.140 In Toomer v. Witsell, an examination of the fishing license 
statute convinced the· Court "that its practical effect is virtually exclu-
sionary. "141 Examining New Hampshire's discriminatory tax scheme 
in Austin v. New Hampshire, 142 the Court again looked to effect: "The 
effect of these imposition and exemption features is that no resident of 
New Hampshire is taxed on his out-of-state income .... In effect, then, 
the State taxes only the incomes of nonresidents working in New 
136. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
137. See Simson, Discrimination Against Nonresidents and The Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV. 128 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 386 (1979) ("[The privileges and immunities 
clause] speaks in absolute, uncompromising terms - noncitizens 'shall be entitled' to 'all' privi-
leges and immunities."); Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. Cm. L. REV. 
487, 516 (1981) ("The unqualified language of the privileges and immunities clause suggests that 
the architects ... deliberately included ... a comprehensive ban on ..• discrimination against the 
citizens of other states." (footnote omitted)). 
138. United Bldg. & Constr. Trade Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 216 (1984) 
(quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948)) (municipal resident hiring-preference law). 
See supra notes 133-34 for a discussion of Camden. 
139. Freund, Umpiring The Federal System, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 561, 567 (1954). 
140. This derives in large part from a tactic of privileges and immunities clause defendants. 
Often, their position is that, despite the statute's facial discrimination, it is in effect neutral and 
that it treats residents and nonresidents similarlJ. It would be ironic for defendants in privileges 
and immunities clause cases to progress from arguing that the effect of the challenged laws is not 
discriminatory to arguing that only the effect is discriminatory. 
141. 334 U.S. 385, 396-97 (1948). 
142. 420 U.S. 656 (1975). 
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Hampshire .... " 143 Some years earlier, the Court had upheld prop-
erty taxes on land owned by out-of-state citizens. In reaching that 
decision, it looked to ''the practical effect and operation" of the tax 
scheme. 144 The two-part privileges and immunities clause inquiry, 
which asks whether a close relationship exists between the discrimina-
tion and a significant governmental interest, is a formula for determin-
ing the act's effect. Asking whether a particular method 
(discrimination) promotes (is closely related to) a· particular goal is 
precisely to ask what the effect of that methoa is. Thus the privileges 
and immunities clause test is a measure of effect. Because the Court 
explicitly and practically relies on the effect of a challenged provision 
in evaluating it, provisions such as GCOs, which have discriminatory 
effect, should be subject to unreduced privileges and immunities clause 
scrutiny.145 
Finally, it would be shortsighted to overlook the history of the ef-
fect of judicial deference to local land use regulation. That deference 
has led to racial exclusion, 146 economic exclusion, 147 and even regula-
tion of the types of families that can live in communities.148 The his-
tory of local discretion in this area does not support the assumption 
that municipalities would employ the license to effect discrimination 
not facially apparent with a consistent regard for fairness. 149 
The language and intent of the privileges and immunities clause, 
the case law it has generated, and the nature of GCOs all counsel un-
diminished GCO review even though they are facially neutral. The 
privileges and immunities clause therefore can and should reach 
GCOs. 
2. The Privileges and Immunities Clause Standard 
Since the privileges and immunities clause reaches GCOs, it is now 
time to examine the privileges and immunities clause. The privileges 
143. 420 U.S. at 659. 
144. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 56 (1920). 
145. See also Justice Kennedy's opinion in Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman: "Noth-
ing in our precedents, moreover, supports the contention that the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause does not reach a State's discrimination against nonresidents when such discrimination 
does not result in their total exclusion from the State." 487 U.S. 59, 66 (1988). This language is 
also important with respect to the objection that GCOs deter migration only at the fringes, and 
do not result in the "total exclusion" of nonresidents. 
146. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 
(1930). . 
147. See," e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 
151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975). 
148. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
149. Indeed, there has even been an attempt to regulate the type of cars residents can park in 
their driveways. The city of Flossmoor, Illinois has attempted to prohibit the parking of pickup 
trucks in residents' driveways. Johnson, For Pickup, No Parking in Its Own Driveway, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 13, 1989, at Al4, col. 6. 
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and immunities clause of the federal constitution is succinct: "The 
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the Privileges and Immu-
nities of Citizens in the several States."150 Like the commerce, extra-
dition, and full faith and credit clauses, it is derived from article IV of 
the Articles of Confederation.151 It shares with those clauses a harmo-
nizing effect on the national union. 
The privileges and immunities clause analysis is a two-step inquiry. 
This two-step test, recently articulated by the Court in Supreme Court 
of Virginia v. Friedman, 152 is (1) whether the regulation affects an in-
terest fundamental enough to trigger the clause's scrutiny, and (2) 
whether there are less intrusive means of furthering that regulation's 
objectives. The test blends together two historically discrete strands of 
privileges and immunities clause inquiry, and the history of their de-
velopment informs the test's application. The first step, described by 
the Court in Friedman as whether the interest affected by the chal-
lenged regulation is "sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Na-
tion,"153 originated in the early nineteenth century privileges and 
immunities clause cases and their concern with "those privilege and 
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental." 154 Sufficiently 
fundamental privileges trigger the second step of the test, where the 
Court requires that the regulation be "closely related to the advance-
ment of a substantial state interest."155 This second step of the inquiry 
apparently began with the Supreme Court's 1920 admonishment that 
"if there be no reasonable ground for the diversity of treatment, it 
abridges the privileges and immunities [clause]."156 
The second prong of the privileges and immunities clause test has 
been reified since 1920. In Toomer v. Witsel/ 157 the Court explained 
that the privileges and immunities clause "does not preclude disparity 
150. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
151. The text of the fourth article of the Articles of Confederation read: 
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people 
of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, 
vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all the privileges and 
immunities of free citizens in the several States, and the people of each State shall have free 
ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of 
trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabit· 
ants thereof respectively, provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent 
the removal of property imported into any State, to any other State of which the owner is an 
inhabitant; provided also, that no imposition, duties, or restriction shall be laid by any State, 
on the property of the United States, or either of them. 
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 94, app. at 591. 
152. 487 U.S. 59 (1988). 
153. 487 U.S. at 64 (quoting United Bldg. & Trade Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 
208, 211 (1984) (quoting Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Commn. v. Baldwin, 436 U.S. 371, 
388 (1978))). 
154. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (No. 3,230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). 
155. 487 U.S. at 65. 
156. Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 79 (1920). 
157. 334 U.S. 385 (1948). 
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of treatment in the many situations where there are perfectly valid 
independent reasons for it. Thus the inquiry in each case must be con-
cerned with whether such reasons do exist and whether the degree of 
discrimination bears a close relation to them."158 The discrimination 
was constitutional if "there is something to indicate that non-citizens 
constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is 
aimed."159 Hicklin v. Orheck 160 concerned a challenge to the Alaska 
Hire law. In that case the Court refined the Toomer test, requiring 
that the discrimination against out-of-staters "bear a substantial rela-
tionship to the particular 'evil' they are said to present."161 The means 
by which that· discrimination was achieved "must be more closely tai-
lored" to the ends sought.162 
This second part of the test has also been cast in terms of a two-
step inquiry. This formulation was summed up by the Court in 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper. 163 The question was 
whether "(i) there is a substantial reason for the difference in treat-
ment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears 
a substantial relationship to the State's objective."164 Though it may 
seem that the structure of the test has reached the limits of clarity, 
both Friedman and Piper conduct this two-step inquiry by asking a 
single question. That question is whether "there exist alternative 
means of furthering the State's purpose without implicating constitu-
tional concerns."165 
The first step of the inquiry will be satisfied if GCOs affect funda-
mental interests protected by the privileges and immunities clause. 
GCOs affect the ability of federal citizens freely to migrate, to settle 
and to acquire property. Thus, the question presented by the first step 
of the privileges and immunities clause analysis is whether these activi-
ties are sufficiently basic to the national enterprise to trigger privileges 
and immunities clause protection. 
This part of the privileges and immunities clause inquiry is in-
formed by examining the cases which develop this part of the test. 
The first case to consider the privileges and immunities clause was 
Maryland's Campbell v. Morris. 166 When defining the words immuni-
ties and privileges, the court stated "it means that the citizens of all 
158. 334 U.S. at 396. 
159. J34 U.S. at 398. 
160. 437 U.S. 518 (1978). 
161. 437 U.S. at 527. 
162. 437 U.S. at 528. 
163. 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (requiring New Hampshire to admit nonresidents to its bar). 
164. 470 U.S. at 284. 
165. Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 67 (1988) (citing Piper, 470 U.S. at 
284). 
166. 3 Md. 288 (1797) (statute requiring different attachment procedures for in-state and 
out-of-state citizens does not violate the privileges and immunities clause). 
1272 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1245 
the States shall have the peculiar advantage of acquiring and holding 
real as well as personal property."167 One of the first federal cases 
construing the privileges and immunities clause was Corjield v. 
Coryell 168 The federal circuit court was concerned with a law that 
denied outstate citizens the privilege of fishing in New Jersey's oyster 
beds. 169 To answer the question, "what are the privileges and immuni-
ties" was a task "more tedious than difficult." 170 The court had "no 
hesitation" in answering that 
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess 
property of every kind, . . . the right of a citizen of one state to pass 
through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture 
or professional pursuits or otherwise; . . . to take, hold and dispose of 
property, either real or personal •.. may be mentioned as some of the 
particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are ... deemed to 
be fundamental .... 171 
The Supreme Court considered the privileges and immunities 
clause in Paul v. Virginia. 172 They viewed the clause in much the same 
way as the Coryell court. The intent of the clause was "to place the 
citizens of each State upon the same footing as citizens of other States 
... ; it insures to them in other States the same freedom possessed by 
the citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of prop-
erty .... "113 
Two years later the Court encountered the privileges and immuni-
ties clause again in Ward v. Maryland. 114 When asked "to define the 
words privileges and immunities," which were "words of very compre-
hensive meaning," the Court felt it was 
sufficient to say that the clause plainly and unmistakably secures and 
protects the right of a citizen of one State to pass into any other State of 
the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce, trade, or 
business without molestation; to acquire personal property; to take and 
167. 3 Md. at 293. 
168. 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3,230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). 
169. The court sustained the law, a result that is extremely unlikely, if not foreclosed, today. 
See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (holding that out·of·state shrimp fishing licensure 
fees one hundred times that of in-state fees were prohibited by the privileges and immunities 
clause). 
170. 6 F. Cas. at 551. 
171. 6 F. Cas. at 551-52 (emphasis added). 
172. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). Paul held that a law requiring special licensing and bond· 
ing procedures for foreign insurance corporations doing business in Virginia did not offend the 
privileges and immunities clause because corporations were not citizens within the meaning of 
the privileges and immunities clause. Paul also held that insurance was not commerce within the 
meaning of the commerce clause. The commerce clause holding of Paul was reversed in United 
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944). This holding, in tum, gener-
ated congressional response in the form of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33 (1954), codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1982) (returning insurance regulation to the states). 
173. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 180. 
174. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870) (invalidating a licensing tax on out-of-state traders 2 to 25 
times higher than that required of in-state traders). 
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hold real estate. 115 
3. Applying the Standard 
The history of the first step of the privileges and immunities clause 
inquiry shows that the clause regards the ability to move to, and to 
buy property in, other states as fundamental. Without housing, the 
privilege of interstate migration is meaningless, and the ability to ac-
quire real property disappears since GCOs artificially constrict hous-
ing supply, 176 they thus affect "sufficiently basic" interests to trigger 
the second step of the privileges and immunities clause test. 
Applying that test will determine whether GCOs are closely re-
lated to the advancement of a substantial governmental interest by 
asking whether their purposes can be achieved by means which do not 
implicate constitutional concerns. The usual purposes of GCOs are to 
give communities time to develop growth plans and to cope with traf-
fic and pollution. What alternative means of coping with growth-
related problems are available? At the outset, it can be argued that the 
planning process is facilitated by growth already underway. An over-
view of emerging settlement, development, and traffic patterns may 
inform the best use of the community's resources. 177 It can suggest 
what boulevards to widen and which rivers shoUld host parks and 
which rivers should host industry. Coordinating local growth with 
that of surrounding communities is a sound approach, and this too is 
more efficiently accomplished when growth is underway.178 Modeling 
local growth plans after those of similarly sized and situated commu-
nities which have successfully coped with growth can hasten the pro-
cess.179 Traffic problems can also be helped by retiming traffic lights, 
amending municipal traffic codes, building highways, and expanding 
mass transit. 180 These steps, in hand with regulation of automobile 
175. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 430 (emphasis added). 
176. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. This argument does not suggest the privileges 
and immunities clause guarantees a house to people in any particular community, but it does 
suggest that in the competition for housing in growing communities, municipalities are not able 
to advantage their current residents at the expense of nonmunicipal federal citizens. A municipal 
law which said "nobody from any other state can move here" would surely be suspect under the 
privileges and immunities clause. As a practical, and a local political, matter this is exactly what 
GCOs say. See News & Views, supra note 7, at 6, col. 5 {"I don't think there's any reason why 
everybody in the country has to come to San Diego ..•. "). 
177. F. CHAPIN & E. KAISER, URBAN LAND USE PLANNING 174 {3d ed. 1979) ("[C]urrent 
population estimates and studies of the present composition and distribution of population are 
essential as a point of beginning in planning analyses and in the continuing task of revising ... 
the resulting plans."). 
178. Id. at 368; see also WELSH OFFICE, GR. BRIT. MINISTRY OF Hous. AND LoCAL GOVT., 
DEVELOPMENT PLANS: A MANUAL ON FORM AND CONTENT 41 {1970). 
179. See, e.g., J. LANSING, R. MARANS & R. ZEHNER, PLANNED RESIDENTIAL ENVIRON-
MENTS (1970) (study of 10 developed communities to determine, inter a/ia, efficient transporta-
tion system design). 
180. See generally J. DICKEY, METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION PLANNING (1970); UR-
BAN TRANSPORTATION PLANNING GUIDE (G. Steuart ed. 1977). 
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and industrial emissions, can alleviate air pollution problems. As a 
technical, as opposed to a substantive matter, the planning process can 
be expedited by extra city planning meetings, accelerated legislative 
action, and support staff overtime. Thus a broad range of constitu-
tionally sound alternative measures is available to enliven the planning 
process and to cope with traffic and growth problems. 
It is important to recognize what this formulation does not mean: 
it does not mean that every conceivable zoning law is unconstitutional. 
It does not mean that a comprehensive general plan with use districts 
and density regulations is invalid because it may have incidental effects 
on federal citizens' privileges and immunities interests.181 It does not 
mean that municipalities are paralyzed in their efforts to deal with 
unexpected growth. It simply means that they may not take aim, 
either deliberately or by default, at their national neighbors because a . 
GCO is a more convenient and less demanding response to growth. 
Moreover, the formulation not only accommodates reasoned re-
sponses to growth, it also allows for the situations where a municipal-
ity might have no alternative means to achieve its growth control 
purpose. But this is a determination that should be based on a hard 
look at the facts and a due regard for the privileges and immunities 
clause. For example, a city with severe budget constraints and a sewer 
system bordering on emergency might have no alternative means. A 
GCO may be the only way such a community could forestall a health 
emergency. In this and other drastic cases, GCOs as a temporary 
measure, to give a city time to upgrade its infrastructure and restore 
fiscal soundness, would likely be constitutionally permissible. But 
where alternative means of achieving the city's goals are available, 
GCOs should fail the privileges and immunities clause test. They im-
plicate fundamental privileges and immunities clause concerns and 
lack a sufficiently close relationship to the public interest. 
B. The Right of Interstate Travel 
It has been suggested that the privileges and immunities clause is 
the source of the right of interstate travel. The right of interstate 
travel shares with the privileges and immunities clause the intention of 
creating a stronger national union. 182 By guaranteeing the right to 
unburdened interstate travel, the right of interstate travel works to 
promote interstate harmony and the health of the nation's econ-
omy.183 The right of interstate travel is a reflection of the fact "that 
181. On comprehensive plans, see generally 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 18, § 23.01-15. On 
use restrictions, see 2 id. § 9.24-53. On density regulation, see 3 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 24, 
§ 34.03. 
182. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966). 
183. Varat, supra note 137, at 511; see also Comment, Another Constitutional Standard, 
supra note 19 at 630. 
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the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of 
personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel 
throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, 
rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this move-
ment." 184 The fundamental nature of that freedom means that the 
right of interstate travel is a fundamental right. Fundamental rights 
are protected by strict scrutiny review under the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection clause. The infringment of fundamental rights 
must be justified by a compelling state interest in order to pass consti-
tutional muster. 
As the term "strict" implies, it is a level of scrutiny few regulations 
can survive.185 The right of interstate travel inquiry has been con-
ducted in terms of a "penalty analysis."186 Shapiro v. Thompson 187 
was the first time the Court invoked strict scrutiny for "any classifica-
tion which serves to penalize the exercise of that right."188 In Memo-
rial Hospital v. Maricopa County the Court disapproved indigent 
health care qualifications which "penalize[d people] for exercising 
their right to migrate to and settle in that State."189 In Dunn v. Blum-
stein the Court invalidated voting requirements which "impermissibly 
condition and penalize the right to [interstate] travel."19° 
GCOs do affect the "free[ dom] to travel throughout the length and 
breadth of our land .... " 191 GCOs raise the price and limit or elimi-
nate the supply of housing. By doing so, they make interstate travel 
and resettlement more difficult, more costly, less feasible, and penalize 
people "for exercising their right to migrate to and settle in that 
State."192 Since they penalize that right, GCOs must be measured 
against the yardstick of strict scrutiny. 
The strict scrutiny analysis that is dictated by the right of inter-
state travel has been described in terms similar to, but more stringent 
than, those of the second step of the privileges and immunities clause 
inquiry. Right of interstate travel analysis requires that "if there are 
other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on 
constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of 
greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose 'less drastic 
184. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (invalidating welfare residency require-
ments which interfered with exercise of the right of interstate travel). 
185. See generally Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: 
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. l, 8 (1972) (discussing "the aggressive 
'new' equal protection with scrutiny that was 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact"). 
186. L. TRIBE, supra note 16, at 1455-57. 
187. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
188. 394 U.S. at 634. 
189. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 261-62 (1974). 
190. 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972). 
191. Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969). 
192. Maricopa, 415 U.S. 250, 261-62 (1974). 
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means.' " 193 Here, as with the privileges and immunities clause, in-
terim planning informed by occurring growth, infrastructural im-
provements, local and state environmental regulation, and accelerated 
planning timetables are examples of constitutionally inoffensive meth-
ods of achieving the same goals. 194 Here too, the right of interstate 
travel will accommodate the extreme case when there is no other way 
to achieve those goals. Since those goals can usually be attained by 
less burdensome means, GCOs will ordinarily fail the strict scrutiny 
right of interstate travel analysis. 
It should be noted that as a practical matter, strict scrutiny-inter-
state travel analysis of GCOs is unlikely to occur. The post-Warren 
Court has been unwilling generally to extend strict scrutiny analysis195 
and several recent right of interstate travel cases have been decided 
under the more limited rational basis scrutiny. 196 The right of inter-
state travel is nonetheless important here. The structural concerns of 
national unity that this right shares with the privileges and immunities 
clause and the commerce clause highlight the nature of the problems 
which GCOs pose. Moreover, it shows, as did the privileges and im-
munities clause, that when reviewed by standards solicitous of na-
tional unity interests, most GCOs are constitutionally infirm. Not 
suprisingly, commerce clause analysis of GCOs offers the same conclu-
sion, and the final section of this Part turns to that clause. 
C. GCOs and the Commerce Clause 
The commerce clause is similar to the privileges and immunities 
clause. Like that clause, it has been suggested as a constitutional basis 
for the right of interstate travel. 197 It shares with the privileges and 
immunities clause and the right of interstate travel the intent of creat-
ing a more cohesive national union:198 The presence of the commerce 
clause has long been held to prohibit state regulation of interstate com-
merce, even where Congress has not chosen to regulate in that area. 199 
This is called the "dormant commerce clause.'' For the dormant com-
merce clause to reach GCOs, they must affect interstate commerce. 
They do. GCOs affect the trade in building materials which would 
193. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)). 
194. See supra section III.A.3. 
195. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (refusing to 
accord fundamental right status, and therefore strict scrutiny, to education); see also Gunther, 
supra note 185, at 12-15. 
196. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 
55 (1982); see also Attorney General v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (plurality believes that 
veteran preference on civil service exam violates right of interstate travel and should receive strict 
scrutiny; two other Justices assert only rational basis scrutiny is necessary). 
197. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 n.8 (1969). 
198. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). 
199. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
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otherwise be sold and used. This trade alone is a sufficient connection 
with interstate commerce to bring GCOs under the clause's aegis. 200 
But given the intent of the clause and its similarity to the privileges 
and immunities clause, it is more appropriate to focus on the people 
who no longer cross state lines because of GCOs. Therefore, this sec-
tion first establishes the proposition that people constitute commerce 
and enable the clause to reach GCOs. 
That people constitute commerce is a conclusion the Court first 
reached in 1894. In Covington and Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 
the people crossing the Covington and Cincinnati Bridge between 
Ohio and Kentucky were "engaged in commerce [as surely] as if they 
were shipping cargoes of merchandise from New York to Liver-
pool."201 In Hoke v. United States, 202 Effie Hoke was prosecuted 
under the White Slave Traffic Act for transporting Annette B~den 
across state lines for purposes of prostitution. Whether people were 
commerce would decide whether Congress had the authority-to enact 
the law. They were, the Court concluded, because "[c]ommerce 
among the States . . . includes the transportation of persons. "203 Fi-
nally, Edwards v. California 204 concerned a law which made it a crime 
to bring indigent people into California. According to the Court, the 
state wished to find "respite from the pressure of events by ... shut-
ting its gates to the outside world."205 Preventing those people from 
entering the state was a "burden upon interstate commerce [both] in-
tended and immediate."206 
That people constitute commerce is a settled issue. By virtue of 
their effect on the migration of people, as well as the trade in building 
materials, GCOs come within the reach of the commerce clause. This 
connection would certainly be sufficient to enable Congress to exercise 
its authority under the clause. The remaining question is whether the 
connection is also sufficient to bring GCOs under the purview of the 
dormant commerce clause. 
Two facts show that it is. First, the effect on interstate migration 
in Edwards was sufficient for the dormant commerce clause to reach 
the law challenged in that case. Second, the Court has explicitly 
stated that the reach of the clause is identical in both its regulatory 
and dormant aspects. This occurred in City of Philadelphia v. New 
200. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (shipping building materials 
across state lines constitutes a connection with commerce sufficient to enable congressional 
regulation). 
201. 154 U.S. 204, 218-19 (1894).' 
202. 227 U.S. 308 (1913). 
203. 227 U.S. at 320. When the issue resurfaced in Carninetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 
491 (1917), it warranted only a reference to Hoke. 
204. 314 U.S. 160 (1941). 
205. 314 U.S. at 173. 
206. 314 U.S. at 174. 
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Jersey, 207 a case which was discussed earlier in connection with the 
Supreme Court's view of federalism.208 The New Jersey Supreme 
Court had upheld New Jersey's landfill law,2°9 and the U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed on the grounds that the restriction constituted a viola-
tion of the dormant commerce clause. The New Jersey court had con-
sidered the commerce clause, but concluded it could not apply to 
landfill. This was based on "the view that there may be two definitions 
of 'commerce' for constitutional purposes."210 New Jersey thought 
the dormant clause had a "much more confined ... reach."211 The 
Supreme Court disagreed. "We think the state court misread our 
cases, and thus erred in assuming that they require a two-tiered defini-
tion of commerce."212 ·There is no distinction between dormant and 
regulatory definitions of commerce. Commerce is commerce. The 
dormant commerce clause will reach GCOs because people constitute 
commerce. 
Since the clause reaches GCOs, the next question is whether it also 
prohibits them. Review under the dormant commerce clause has long 
been concerned with the effect of a regulation on interstate com-
merce. 213 This, and the purpose the clause shares with the privileges 
and immunities clause, preempts facial neutrality defenses. The pre-
vailing test is articulated in Hughes v. Oklahoma. 214 Hughes held that 
a law forbidding out-of-state transportation of minnows violated the 
commerce clause. The test which supplied the "general rule" used by 
the court was "(1) whether the challenged statute ... discriminates 
against interstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect; (2) 
whether the statute serves a legitimate local purpose; and if so, (3) 
whether alternative means could promote this local purpose as well 
without discriminating against interstate commerce."215 
The first inquiry under this test is whether GCOs discriminate 
against interstate commerce "in practical effect," if not on their face. 
The effect on interstate migration that establishes the basis for com-
merce clause review also satisfies the first step of this test. The next 
step is also satisfied. The local purposes used to justify GCOs - alle-
207. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
208. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text. 
209. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Commn. v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 68 N.J. 
451, 348 A.2d 505 (1975). 
210. 437 U.S. at 621. 
211. 437 U.S. at 621 (quoting Hackensack, 68 N.J. at 469, 348 A.2d at 514). 
212. 437 U.S. at 622. 
213. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 
U.S. 137 (1970); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commn., 432 U.S. 333 (1977); see 
also Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Com· 
merce Clause, 84 MICH L. REv. 1091, 1105-07 (1986); Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the 
Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1708 (1984). 
214. 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (overruling Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896)). 
215. 441 U.S. at 336. 
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viation of traffic and pollution problems and planning grace periods -
are unquestionably legitimate. The purposes are equally so in the crit-
ical case where the alternatives are a public health emergency or mu-
nicipal bankruptcy. Most GCOs, however, will run afoul of the third 
element of the test. In all but the extraordinary case, those purposes 
can be satisfied by other measures.216 Since those purposes can usually 
be achieved without "discriminating against interstate commerce," 
most GCOs will be prohibited by the dormant commerce clause. 
Under all three bases of review proposed by this section, then, 
GCOs are found wanting. The common thread running through these 
three areas is that of nationai unity. It is not so much that GCOs are 
repugnant to a collection of constitutional protections as it is that they 
intrude on the underlying theme of national unity. With that interest 
in mind, this Part concludes with a return to the question of due pro-
cess review of GCOs. 
D. Due Process Revisited 
This examination of more appropriate bases of GCO review should 
further illustrate the point made in Part I: Due process is the wrong 
standard for reviewing GCOs. GCOs implicate national interests and 
should be examined under the bases which recognize those interests. 
The due process clause was not designed to consider the national inter-
ests in unity, travel, and resettlement. The privileges and immunities 
clause, the right of interstate travel, and the commerce clause were. 
They approach the problem from a national perspective. Their stan-
dards do not have to be changed, as due process standards need to be, 
to accommodate the national unity interests that are compromised by 
GCOs. Furthermore, the Euclidian deference appropriate to local reg-
ulators under the due process clause is inappropriate when GCOs are 
considered. The privileges and immunities clause, the right of inter-
state travel, and the commerce clause instead accord deference to the 
needs of national unity. The due process clause is better left to the 
areas it was meant to regulate: takings and compensation. 
CONCLUSION 
GCOs are a complicated issue. The quality of life in developing 
communities is an issue of no small moment to the people who do and 
will live there. Unplanned and poorly planned growth can devastate 
that quality. Moreover, it would seem that GCOs are entitled to pre-
sumptive respect because they arise from the police power so necessary 
to the orderly function of society. If the only interests implicated by 
GCOs were the pecuniary losses of local developers, that deference 
216. See supra section 111.A.3. 
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would be appropriate. But one of the reasons that GCOs are a compli-
cated issue is that they affect a myriad of other interests. 
They affect the interests of federal citizens in migrating freely 
about the union. They affect the interests of the union in maintaining 
harmony and cooperation among its members. That interest in har-
mony was regarded as .fundamental by the Framers and woven into 
the text of the Constitution they wrote. The Court in turn has repeat-
edly affirmed the national unity prescription of the Constitution in 
cases involving the protections which embody that unity. The breadth 
of the GCO issue is again made apparent by the many constitutional 
protections they offend as they intrude on national unity. Those pro-
tections are the privileges and immunities clause, the right of interstate 
travel and the commerce clause. 
Because these protections are solicitous of the needs of national 
unity and because the due process clause is ill-equipped to consider 
those needs, it is against these protections which GCOs must be 
gauged. While the public welfare component of the due process stan-
dards could be expanded to consider those interests, that approach 
cheats both the due process standards and the issues they are ex-
panded to include. The privileges and immunities clause, the right. of 
interstate travel, and the commerce clause teach a single lesson: 
GCOs are constitutionally infirm except where no other solution is 
possible. Yes, proper regard for the interests of national unity and 
federal citizens may cause some hardships for citizens of growing com-
munities. But since the days of the Constitutional Convention it has 
been clear that these federal and national interests are more compel-
ling. It is in their favor that the balances must tip when GCOs are 
weighed. 
- Keith R. Denny 
